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In 1987, Susanna Clark and Richard Leigh composed a set of lyrics for their country song, “Come
from the Heart”, that have subsequently found a mass-audience afterlife in several internet memes:
“You’ve got to sing like you don’t need the money / Love like you’ll never get hurt / You’ve got to
dance like nobody’s watchin’ / It’s gotta come from the heart if you want it to work”. For academic
scholarly communications, however, the well-known humorous Twitter persona of @NeinQuarterly
(Eric  Jarosinski)  perhaps reformulated this  best  when he cynically wrote:  “Tweet like nobody's
reading. / Because: / They're not”.1
Indeed,  in  recent  years  the  open-access  movement  has  sought  to  broaden  the  potential
audiences for scientific and scholarly publications by removing price and permission barriers for
readers.2 This has often been rationalised through critiques of the limited readership of paywalled
journal  articles  and  expensive  scholarly  monographs  that  are  disseminated  only  to  academic
1 @NeinQuarterly, ‘Tweet like Nobody’s Reading.  Because: They’re Not.’, Twitter, 2013 
<https://twitter.com/neinquarterly/status/630538393219407872> [accessed 18 January 2014].
2 Peter Suber, Open Access, Essential Knowledge Series (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2012) <http://bit.ly/oa-book>; 
Martin Paul Eve, Open Access and the Humanities: Contexts, Controversies and the Future (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2014) <http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316161012>.
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libraries.3 In many ways, the goals of the open-access movement are noble in their quest to ensure
that  as  many  citizens  of  the  world  as  possible  can  access  and  read  high-quality  research  and
scholarship.
Yet, as Clark and Leigh knew just as well as Foucault, the belief that one might be being
watched can trigger a shame reaction that inhibits practices, from dancing through to publishing
writing, even though both are acts that intrinsically call for attention. In this chapter I examine a set
of  theoretical  questions  surrounding  observation,  readership,  and  openness  for  niche,  esoteric
research practices across a range of disciplines. These include: What behavioural changes might we
expect to see in a world of mass readership? How does a new set of publics sit alongside emergent
managerial  practices  at  institutions  focusing on public  “impact”? And might  there be  a  certain
'shame' that cuts both ways here: a shame at exposing our work to an imagined plurality of gazes
that  may  misunderstand,  misconstrue,  or  simply  interpret  the  work  differently  to  our  authorial
intentions, even while feeling ashamed at hiding our writings? Is there even a shame in the act of
writing when one believes that the potential audience is disinterested?
As a  launch pad for  the  work  in  this  chapter,  I  take  the  autoethnographic,  self-writing
approach of Elspeth Probyn in her well-known piece, “Writing Shame”.4 Of particular interest to me
here is the opening portion of Probyn's work, in which she writes of the shame of writing within an
academic framework alongside the physical, embodied shame-response that she has in considering
her  own inability  to  convey interest  to  others.  This  is  split  in  Probyn's  piece  across  structural
academic anxieties, self-nervousness about the relationship of writing to reality, bodily responses,
shame and glory, the importance of proximity and distance, and the specific case of the writing of
Primo Levi.5 While Probyn's work in this piece – and indeed more broadly in her book on the
subject, Blush: Faces of Shame – is brave and self-exposing, I also feel critical of how it disregards
3 Philip M. Davis, ‘Open Access, Readership, Citations: A Randomized Controlled Trial of Scientific Journal 
Publishing’, FASEB Journal: Official Publication of the Federation of American Societies for Experimental 
Biology, 25.7 (2011), 2129–34 <https://doi.org/10.1096/fj.11-183988>.
4 Elspeth Probyn, ‘Writing Shame’, in The Affect Theory Reader, ed. by Melissa Gregg and Gregory J. Seigworth 
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010), pp. 71–90.
5 Probyn, ‘Writing Shame’, pp. 71–76.
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the  media  through which academics communicate, within a piece that is fundamentally about a
shameful inadequacy of communication.
For  if  there  is  any truth  in  the  assertion  that  the  media  is  still  the  message,  then  it  is
important that we consider, within a variety of contexts of “shame”, how the structural elements of
scholarly  communications  condition  different  types  of  shame.  As  Juliet  Jacquet  has  framed  it,
“[e]ach time communication was transformed, shaming was as well”.6 For the niche modes that
have historically developed to facilitate the communication of academic ideas have done so in a
way conditioned by economic and material systems that drastically limit the audience for academic
writing. If shame in writing is, as Probyn contends, “sheer disappointment in the self” amplified “to
a painful level”, then it is much easier to be content with one's self-performance if the audience for
the work is limited to those pre-disposed to receive it well; fellow academics.7 Of course, there can
still  be shame in writing for peer  review and academic colleagues;  especially  if  one makes an
oversight or gets something wrong. However, as I will go on to discuss, the fears around a broader,
unknown public audience, particularly for some of the humanities disciplines, carries a far greater
potential for the amplification of shame.
Observation, Discipline, and Societies of Control
Before it is possible to venture any remarks upon shame in academic publishing and readership, it is
first  necessary  to  give  some  definition  of  shame  that  could  work  within  the  scholarly
communications context and to explain how it would be linked to observation and visibility, the
subjects focused upon by the open-access movement. This is at least  in part  because,  in recent
years, shame has been tightly coupled to being  seen within social contexts. Indeed, as has been
noted elsewhere  in  this  volume,  Jacquet  has  explicitly  defined shame as  a  fear  of  reputational
6 Jennifer Jacquet, Is Shame Necessary?: New Uses for an Old Tool (London: Penguin Random House, 2016), p. 18; 
Ruth Benedict, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture, Reprint [der Ausg.] Cleveland, 
Meridian Books, 1967 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co, 1989).
7 Probyn, ‘Writing Shame’, p. 73.
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damage through exposure to the specific, but historically mutable, social conditions within which an
individual exists.8 Yet, for Jacquet, this socialized experience of shame is contrasted with guilt as a
personal and unsociable experience, which she claims is a more prominent affective experience
within  a  highly  individualized  society  (drawing  on  the  earlier  anthropological  work  of  Ruth
Benedict and Margaret Mead).9 
If  we  acknowledge,  then,  that  Jacquet's  definition  of  shame  as  opposed  to  guilt  is
incomplete, but functionally well-suited to her project's goal of using shaming as a social-justice
tool,  we can  still  agree  that  observation has  a  role  to  play in  the  emotion of  shame.10 Indeed,
Deleuze's  account  of  shame  in  T.E.  Lawrence,  for  example,  uses  the  Spinozean  concept  of
autonomous corporeal  responses as  being linked to  shame.  For Deleuze's  Lawrence,  “the body
never ceases to act and react before the mind moves it” and these involuntary weaknesses make the
mind – which is nonetheless perceived as inseparable from the body – ashamed for the body.11 Most
tellingly,  though,  these reflexive bodily actions  that  the mind cannot  condition (in  this  case an
erection) make Lawrence wish to “crawl away and hide until the shame was passed”, implying that
the observation is here key.12 Yet the way in which Probyn extends Deleuze's observed bodily shame
is also to frame shame as a productive force that can be seen through intersubjective interest.13 It
may not quite be that “in shame we are reduced to being an object only for the other's jurisdiction”,
as framed by Jennifer Biddle, but it does nonetheless seem true that, as Probyn puts it, unless you
care about the an observing or observed object, there can be no shame: “only something or someone
that has interested you can produce a flush of shame”.14
8 Jacquet, p. 9.
9 Jacquet, pp. 11, 36.
10 I also have extreme reservations about the positive spin that Jacquet puts on shaming as a tool for transforming 
corporate practices since the practice seems to me to more often be used to prey upon specific, often gendered, 
groups in the online space.
11 Gilles Deleuze, ‘The Shame and the Glory: T.E. Lawrence’, in Essays Critical and Clinical, trans. by Daniel W. 
Smith and Michael A. Greco (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), pp. 115–25 (p. 123).
12 T.E. Lawrence, The Seven Pillars of Wisdom: A Triumph (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Doran, 1935), III, p. 188.
13 Elspeth Probyn, Blush: Faces of Shame (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005).
14 Jennifer Biddle, ‘Shame’, Australian Feminist Studies, 12.26 (1997), 227–39 (p. 227) 
<https://doi.org/10.1080/08164649.1997.9994862>; Probyn, Blush, pp. ix–x.
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Alongside  many  other  commentators,  however,  Gilles  Deleuze  rightly  recognizes  that
“Foucault  located  the  disciplinary  societies”  of  regulatory  observation,  “in  the  eighteenth  and
nineteenth centuries” and that they “reach their height at the outset of the twentieth”.15 The system
of individualisation  and discipline  by enclosure,  in  other  words,  is  a  historically  localized,  not
contemporary,  phenomenon.  Foucault  himself  saw this,  stating  that  “[p]ower  is  not  discipline;
discipline is a possible procedure of power” and that “[c]onsequently these analyses can in no way,
to my mind, be equated with a general analytics of every power relation”.16 While this implied
injunction against using discipline as a catch-all description of contemporary power relations has
not been thoroughly heeded, Deleuze himself proposes a successor: the societies of control.
Societies  of  control,  for  Deleuze,  are  not  like  disciplinary  societies.  Where  disciplinary
societies  must  individualise  by  segregation,  Deleuze  claimed  in  1990  that  we  are  “now  in  a
generalized crisis in relation to all the environments of enclosure”.17 The replacement of factories
(as  spaces  of  disciplinary  enclosure)  in  the  contemporary  West  by  “gas”-like  corporations  that
permeate the entirety of society instigates,  for Deleuze,  a mode of control.  In other words,  the
society may be open not enclosed, apparently free not imprisoned, but thanks to your smart phone
your boss's emails can reach you wherever you are. Schooling is replaced, in Deleuze's societies of
control, by a “permanent training” of corporations, a continuing professional development, in which
the young are “motivated” to request such training.18 From a prescient viewpoint of 1990, Deleuze
successfully described the dominant power mechanisms of the early twenty-first century, at least in
abstract terms. It is the open prison that matters, less the total surveillance mode.
Shame then may be an “experience of the self by the self”, as Silvan Tomkins put it in the
1950s, but it still is about that self “increas[ing] its visibility” in order to generate “the torment of
15 Gilles Deleuze, ‘Postscript on the Societies of Control’, October, 59 (1992), 3–7 (p. 3).
16 Michel Foucault, ‘Politics and Ethics: An Interview’, in The Foucault Reader, ed. by Paul Rabinow, trans. by 
Catherine Porter (London: Penguin, 1991), pp. 373–80 (p. 380); See also, Stuart Elden, Foucault’s Last Decade 
(Malden, MA: Polity, 2016), p. 208.
17 Deleuze, ‘Postscript on the Societies of Control’, pp. 3–4.
18 Deleuze, ‘Postscript on the Societies of Control’, p. 7.
6/22
self-consciousness”.19 For Tomkins, this is located within a contemporary “taboo on looking” that
acts as an amplifier of shame-humiliation affects.20 This focus on a shame affect engendered by
surveillance and systems of watching also links to one of the core things that “theory knows today”,
in  the  (ironic)  words  of  Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick and Adam Frank,  namely  that  “[t]he  bipolar,
transitive relations of subject to object, self to other, and active to passive, and the physical sense
(sight) understood to correspond most closely to these relations, are dominant organizing tropes” for
theory “to the extent that their dismantling as such is framed as both an urgent and interminable
task”.21 In other words, if we sit within societies of control with disciplinary cores, we should expect
the taboo on looking to create a heightened web of shame, a network of internalised humiliation
based on internalised societal norms.
Yet,  before  moving back to  publishing,  it  does  seem that  the  society  of  control  is  less
effective  than the disciplinary society. This can be seen by the fact that, when individuals do not
succumb to the control society's mechanisms of media for self-surveillance, a disciplinary regime is
re-instigated.  We  still  have  supermax  prisons  that  isolate  'deviant'  individuals  under  intense
surveillance  by a  relatively  scarce  number  of  guards  in  order  to  bring  prisoners  into  line.  Put
otherwise: although the broader societies of control have replaced a mass disciplinary movement,
the  panoptic,  isolating,  and  individualising  mechanisms  of  Foucault's  disciplinary  societies  –
supposed, we are told, to have vanished into the past – exist as a subform of the contemporary.
What we actually seem to have are societies of control that house societies of discipline.
Academic Publishing
We can see some of these sub-societies of discipline at work in contemporary institutions. Hospitals
have disciplinary teams, prisons have disciplinary regimes, and the university has disciplines. While
19 Silvan Tomkins, ‘Shame-Humiliation and Contempt-Disgust’, in Shame and Its Sisters: A Silvan Tomkins Reader, 
ed. by Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick and Adam Frank (Durham: Duke University Press, 1995), pp. 133–78 (p. 136).
20 Tomkins, pp. 145–48.
21 Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick and Adam Frank, ‘Reading Silvan Tomkins’, in Shame and Its Sisters: A Silvan Tomkins 
Reader, ed. by Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick and Adam Frank (Durham: Duke University Press, 1995), pp. 1–28 (p. 1).
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the shackles of disciplinarity have been under threat from demands for interdisciplinary approaches
for many years, these have not fully been shrugged.22 Indeed, as Alexander R. Galloway recently
put it, interdisciplinarity has a skewed benefit away from a home discipline that usually takes an
Other discipline and merely uses it, creating an asymmetric relationship of benefit: “[u]ltimately it
comes down to this: if you count words in Moby-Dick, are you going to learn more about the white
whale? I think you probably can — and we have to acknowledge that. But you won’t learn anything
new about counting”.23 Medical humanists might argue differently, claiming that the hermeneutic
approaches of the humanities could bring benefit to both medics and humanists (in the reading and
interpretation of radiograms for instance), but many instances of interdisciplinarity are more of the
type sketched by Galloway. The disciplines – which bring professionalization and specialization
through isolation – are well and alive in the academy.
These disciplinary sub-societies also have strictly codified and, from the outside at least,
bizarre  sets  of  disciplinary  practices  to  which  the  inside  denizens  must  adhere.  These  curious
practices range from the wearing of traditional robes and gowns to arcane graduation ceremonies
but, I think, find an important locus in the systems of dissemination of research material produced
by the academy.
Academic publishing is a space where intellectual freedom must be key and this accounts
for  some  of  the  eccentricities  of  the  academic  remuneration  system  when  compared  to  other
endeavours. For universities are among the last contemporary places where researchers are paid to
produce work to which they own the copyright and that they are free to give away to whichever
publisher they wish.  Peter  Suber believes that a system like this  may emerge in any advanced
research ecosystem, since it gives a form of academic freedom to those who work beneath it.24 This
22 And the debate has raged for some time. See, for instance, Stanley Fish, ‘Being Interdisciplinary Is so Very Hard to 
Do’, Profession, 1989, 15–22 <https://doi.org/10.2307/25595433>.
23 Melissa Dinsman and Alexander R. Galloway, ‘The Digital in the Humanities: An Interview with Alexander 
Galloway’, Los Angeles Review of Books <https://lareviewofbooks.org/article/the-digital-in-the-humanities-an-
interview-with-alexander-galloway/> [accessed 19 April 2016].
24 Suber, p. 10.
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freedom is specifically a freedom of researchers from certain types of market practice. Researchers
are not dependent upon a market of selling research to make their living (although in many higher
education  environments,  they  are  dependent  upon  a  market  of  so-called  'student  recruitment'
through teaching). This freedom from the market is good for research, though, because it allows the
investigation of niche and esoteric areas that would not find a large-scale market audience but that
are important for the sake of knowledge.25 Long before the discourses of marketisation entered
widespread  circulation,  the  university  designed  structures  for  the  production  of  speculative
knowledge, even if such structures were bound within other elitist educational models of liberal
humanism.
Such freedom is also important because the markets that might form in academic publishing
are strange and not necessarily like other markets. Firstly, although the potential audience is small,
at maybe 200-250 copies for a humanities monograph, the audience is somewhat captive. Because
universities demand field mastery from academics, they must have read all relevant material. This
means  that  the  relatively  small  audience  has  a  relatively  high  incentive  to  purchase  material.
Secondly,  as  novelty  is  usually  a  criterion  of  academic  publishing,  there  can  be  little  genuine
competition between items. If an academic needs to read a specific research article or book, then no
substitute good will achieve that purpose. One cannot suggest reading a different article or book
since  the  research  work  within  the  originally  sought  piece  holds  a  micro-monopoly  on  that
knowledge. Both of these measures – the small but motivated audience and the micro-monopolistic
situation – conspire to frustrate any price-setting mechanism of a market based on downwards price
pressure. At the same time, these measures make it difficult or impossible, in many disciplines, for
an academic to make a living purely by selling research work.
25 It is also important to add that various government and funding agendas can also have a type of market-like soft-
power effect on the choice of research topic. For instance, the UK's 'impact agenda' rewards institutions with 
funding when they can demonstrate that the research work that is undertaken has resulted in behavioural change 
outside of the academy. This, to some extent, then incentivizes both a choice of popular research topic and late-
stage translational work. Both of these aspects leads to a type of populism that is similar to a market-based system. 
However, the point that I seek to make here is that there remains, at least in theory, a system of remuneration for 
producing research in the university that is different to other spaces.
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Yet, the problem here is that while researchers are free to investigate niche topics through
their  university  salaries,  even  when  soft-power  mechanisms  may  be  used  to  drive  researchers
towards “impactful” topics, publishers are not in the same position. Publishers must usually work
within this unusual market, selling the work of academics to which they have contributed. For there
are  many  different  forms  of  publisher  labour  that  stretch  from  commissioning,  typesetting,
copyediting, proofreading, (digital)  preservation, printing,  distribution,  marketing,  finance, legal,
among others that must be remunerated. While academics may be more free from some specific
market pressures to make a living, then, publishers are not. This is part of the reason why some
have suggested that open access – in which researchers and publishers disseminate material online
in a way that is free to read and reuse – should be paid for by universities; it would offer, then, the
same type of freedom to publishers.
As a result of this strange market, the academic publishing environment is also somewhat
twisted. The market, estimated to be worth about £10bn per year, is dominated by a relatively small
number of players (Elsevier, Wiley, Sage, Taylor & Francis, Oxford University Press, Cambridge
University Press, Nature), the most commercially aggressive of which makes approximately 36%
profit  per  year,  with  the  long-tail  of  the  market  dwindling  to  a  set  of  smaller  mission-driven
publishers who sit perhaps only one lawsuit away from bankruptcy.26 This dysfunctional market,
with a few very large players and a captive audience, whose monopolistic elements derive from the
micro-monopolies inherent in the novelty that academia requires, sits at the heart of university-level
research.
The Shame of Limited Circulation
As mentioned above, there are a number of reasons why academic material has limited circulation.
The first is that research material is niche and esoteric, usually highly segregated into a disciplinary
26 For more see Stuart Lawson, Jonathan Gray and Michele Mauri, ‘Opening the Black Box of Scholarly 
Communication Funding: A Public Data Infrastructure for Financial Flows in Academic Publishing’, Open Library 
of Humanities, 2.1 (2016) <https://doi.org/10.16995/olh.72>; Eve.
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silos, and therefore often of interest to a limited number of parties. This is not to say that there will
not be other interested audiences who should have access, it is to point out that the main readers of
research articles and books are academics and students. The challenge, though, is that we do not
have  good  evidence  that  this  would  be  the  case  were  there  no  paywalls  to  access  research
worldwide.
That said, in the Latin American context, where a great deal more research is born both
digital and open, Juan Pablo Alperin has shown that 9% of access to the SciELO platform (the
major publishing platform there) is by those outside the academy; the general public.27 Furthermore,
in that demographic survey, 50% of users of SciELO were students, of which 20% were most likely
still in high school.28 Indeed, more broadly, the “Who Needs Access?” site has made its mission to
chart the demographics and stories of people who do not have access to the research from publicly
funded research but would benefit from it. Among the categories of people they list are: translators,
research organizations, small businesses, people working with the developing world, doctors and
dentists,  nurses,  teachers,  politicians,  consumer  organizations,  patients,  patient  groups,  amateur
palaeontologists,  astronomers  and  ornithologists,  Wikipedia  contributors,  bloggers,  unaffiliated
scholars  working  into  their  retirement,  professional  researchers,  independent  researchers,
publishers, and artists.29 In fact, even if only 1% of the general public wanted access to research
material (a low estimate, as above), rounding a 2013 approximation of a world population down to
seven billion,  this  would have been 70,000,000 people.  Taking this  figure  at  10% and this  70
million becomes 700 million people.
That said, anecdotal conversations with researchers (particularly in the humanities) lead to
denials of this claim. The biggest shame, I have been told by face-to-face peers and peer reviewers,
27 Juan Pablo Alperin, ‘The Public Impact of Latin America’s Approach to Open Access’ (unpublished PhD, Stanford, 
2015), p. 49 <https://purl.stanford.edu/jr256tk1194> [accessed 21 April 2016].
28 80% of respondents who claimed only to having completed a high-school education also claimed they were 
undergraduate students, leaving 20% who were students but not undergraduates claiming the lowest tier: high-
school. Alperin, p. 50.
29 ‘Who Needs Access? You Need Access!’, Who Needs Access?  You Need Access! <https://whoneedsaccess.org/> 
[accessed 21 April 2016].
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comes from indifference and the fact that many researchers know that they are producing work that
few will read. I still refuse to believe that this is entirely the case, though. Indeed, on the open-
access journal platform that I founded and run, the Open Library of Humanities, the 909 articles that
we published in our first twelve months were viewed 118,686 times (counting unique views). That
is an average of 131 views per article, although clearly the spread is not even and what a 'view'
really means (we mean: they stayed on the page for more than 20 seconds) could be divided from
the idea of a 'reader'.30 So the question that I return in the face of the shame that nobody wants to
read such work is: how do you know?
Indeed, to deny access to between the aforementioned 70 million and 700 million people for
research that we have allowed researchers to give away (in some limited senses) seems to be a
shame. Sites such as “Who Needs Access?” are meant to foster a self-aware shame in academics
and publishers through an amplification in visibility. As well as providing narrative evidence, it is
clear that the site is meant to shame academics for squandering their claimed freedom. Yet the move
to make research material openly available meets with continued resistance and scepticism for a
variety  of  reasons.  David  Wojick,  previously  a  consultant  with  the  Office  of  Scientific  and
Technical  Information  at  the  U.S.  Department  of  Energy  in  the  area  of  information  and
communication science, noted in early 2016 on the conservative scholarly communications blog
The Scholarly Kitchen that “I personally doubt that there are large numbers of people who (1) have
the expert knowledge required to read and benefit from the scholarly literature but who (2) cannot
find a way to access what they need”.31 To the first of these points, approximately 40-50% of the
populations of Canada, the UK, the USA, Norway, Australia, France, and Sweden have attended
university and therefore almost half of the national populations have the expert knowledge required
30 ‘The Open Library of Humanities: Year One’, Open Library of Humanities, 2016 
<https://about.openlibhums.org/2016/09/12/the-open-library-of-humanities-year-one/> [accessed 10 October 2016].
31 David Wojick, ‘Comment on Sci-Hub and the Four Horsemen of the Internet’, The Scholarly Kitchen, 2016 
<https://scholarlykitchen.sspnet.org/2016/03/02/sci-hub-and-the-four-horsemen-of-the-internet/#comment-158522>
[accessed 21 April 2016].
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to read and benefit from the scholarly literature.32 The second point is harder to query but centres
around ideas of discoverability in scholarly communications that merits one further detour here.
With many types of goods, it is possible to know whether or not they are wanted before
purchase. If I dislike mushrooms, for example, then I am unlikely to buy mushrooms. I must, at
some point in my life, have eaten a mushroom to know this, though.33 This usually means that on
one occasion I will have bought mushrooms, but probably on one occasion only. With research
material, this is, again, not possible. Every single article or book is different and unique. I cannot
usually have enough foreknowledge of an article's content and use to me to merit the $30 single
article price or a yearly subscription in advance. There are, of course, other goods that are a little
like this. Music sold on compact discs, for example. Except that usually record stores will allow
potential  customers  to  listen  to  the  CD  in  advance.  The  same  does  not  go  for  the  micro-
monopolistic world of research material.
The  specific  form of  shame that  is  shaped  within  the  context  of  limited  circulation  of
research material here is of a political and negative historico-charitable nature. To understand this,
we must properly conceive of education (and higher education research) in the Western tradition, at
least,  within  a  backdrop  of  a  liberal  humanist  theory  of  education.  Such  a  stance  would  see
education  as  necessary  for  the  creation  of  a  enlightened  population,  capable  of  participating
coherently within a democratic system. We see this continued to this day in several aspects. The
first is the continued defence of the humanities system against marketisation using this very logic.
Indeed, as Michael Bérubé charts it, recounting a letter from his Dean, “[a] traditional liberal arts
education has theoretically affirmed the belief in the existence of a certain kind of knowledge or
wisdom – as opposed to information, or content – that is timeless and universally valuable to the
human spirit”.34 Bérubé does not himself hold this view, but there is something enduring about the
32 See, for instance OECD, Education at a Glance 2011: OECD Indicators, 2011, pt. Indicator A1: To What Extent 
have People Studied? Table A1.3a. Population with Tertiary Education (2009) <http://www.oecd.org>.
33 Of course, a range of other socio-cultural factors may also influence supposed 'market' choices in this respect, such 
as class, upbringing, unconscious associations and more.
34 Michael Bérubé, ‘Value and Values’, in The Humanities, Higher Education, and Academic Freedom: Three 
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liberal-humanist  myth,  even  while  humanists  cannot  claim  this  viewpoint  explicitly  “in  good
conscience”, since the anti-historicism and universality of the claim is opposed to most humanistic
discourse.35
More broadly,  though,  in  the early twenty-first  century,  the collapse of  the (nonetheless
false) liberal humanist myth is at least partially linked to a history of charity law and its undoing
through  privatization  initiatives.  In  most  jurisdictions  with  charity  laws,  the  advancement  of
education has been set aside as a legitimate charitable purpose. Indeed, in the USA, section 501(c)
(3) of the Internal Revenue Code specifies the “advancement of education or science” as a valid
claim for federal tax relief and in the UK the Charity Commission has a similar clause.36 These laws
are rooted in a history of “public benefit” that also finds an etymological and theological locus in
the term  caritus. Most importantly for the way in which education is framed, however, there is
supposed to be a relationship of superiority of the giver over the receiver in a charitable transaction.
Indeed, charity is often framed as giving to the unfortunate and there is meant to be an element of
humility,  or  even  shame,  in  accepting  charity;  at  least  under  present  discourse.  Yet,  religious
organizations and universities, alongside private schools, are often charitable organizations that can
accept donations or state funding. These educational organizations, claiming a public benefit, are
now all but private in many parts of the world, though. The well-known descent of publicly-funded
higher  education  substituted  for  fees  and  income-contingent  repayment  loans  can  lead  us  to
question what the public benefit of the university might actually be.37
There is a good argument that the continued public benefit of universities lies within their
research function, even as teaching is commodified into an income-generating service. However,
Necessary Arguments, by Michael Bérubé and Jennifer Ruth (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), pp. 27–56 (p. 
29).
35 Again, see Bérubé, p. 29.
36 I apologise for the Anglocentric bias in this survey of charity laws. I have gone with the areas with which I am most
familiar. Internal Revenue Service, ‘Exempt Purposes - Internal Revenue Code Section 501(c)(3)’, 2015 
<https://www.irs.gov/Charities-&-Non-Profits/Charitable-Organizations/Exempt-Purposes-Internal-Revenue-Code-
Section-501(c)(3)> [accessed 5 May 2016]; The Charity Commission, UK, ‘Charitable Purposes’, 2013 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/charitable-purposes> [accessed 5 May 2016].
37 For more on this, see Andrew McGettigan, The Great University Gamble: Money, Markets and the Future of 
Higher Education (London: Pluto Press, 2013).
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when that research is behind expensive paywalls and largely inaccessible to the general public, this
charitable history is demolished. Thus, while profiting from tax relief for public benefit, institutions
of higher education can become shameful recipients of charity that are also unable to make good on
any publicly available benefit. This is a shame of un-repaid debt. Researchers, of course, can change
this through making their work open access. However, as I will now discuss, the combination of a
symbolic economy and a shame linked to visibility often makes this less likely.38
Shamed in the Public Gaze
Let us assume, though, that researchers do begin to make their works publicly available. What are
the risks here with respect to shame and visibility? What behavioural changes might we expect as
works  are  made  more  broadly  accessible?  And  what  do  tabloid  media  norms  about  certain
disciplinary practices do to shape a space of shaming?
The first point to note is that open access has met with vociferous resistance from some
academic researchers in respect to public access. Robin Osborne, for example, states that it is the
case  that  (and  should  be  the  case  that)  “the  primary  beneficiary  of  research-funding  is  the
researcher” and that “[a]cademic research is a process – a process which universities teach (at a
fee)”. For Osborne, a Cambridge-based classicist writing about the humanities, the risks are that
making the end-publication available neither captures the act of performing the research itself nor
exposes the research to an informed audience since “academic research publication is a form of
teaching that assumes some prior knowledge”.39 This line of attack misses the fact that there is a
public appetite for research publications and a large number of university-level educated readers
who cannot afford access. It also, though, strikes me as betraying a shame, centred around notions
of observed norm violation. In fact, Osborne closes his piece with the adage that “[m]uch more will
be downloaded;  much less  will  be understood”,  which I  will  argue fits  well  with many of the
38 See Eve, chap. 2.
39 Robin Osborne, ‘Why Open Access Makes No Sense’, in Debating Open Access (London: British Academy, 2013), 
pp. 96–105 (p. 104).
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observational-related shame paradigms that I outlined earlier in this piece.40 For there is certainly an
intra-academic norm for reception here; what Osborne frames as understanding. The violation of
that norm leads to a fear that research – especially from the humanities disciplines – will be misused
and re-contextualised within a culture where it does not make the same sense. If that norm is more
broadly held and the piece is seen as nonsensical by a broader population, it is likely to trigger a
shaming reaction.
Indeed, there have been a number of occasions where various right-wing tabloid newspapers
have picked up on research stories – often on the advice of so-called think-tanks – in order to
attempt to ridicule and shame the research and researchers. Examples include the UK's Daily Mail
attacking research into human-chicken interactions and The Times and The Telegraph both running
stories  attacking  research  into  “why  cookies  crumble”  and  “why  don’t  woodpeckers  get
headaches”.41 Of course, within a university context, such questions can easily be reframed: “how
are the musculoskeletal systems of woodpeckers able to withstand intense, repetitive shock without
the  onset  of  cephalalgia?”  or  the  surely  useful  to  the  biscuit  industry:  “what  causes  particular
disintegration of some baked goods over others?” These research questions, which are totally valid,
are here taken by the press and de-normalized/ridiculed. By crafting a new norm for the soundness
of research, through ridicule and humiliation, in order to serve the paper's and think-tank's political
goals of cutting public funding of higher education, such news publications are attempting to use
shame as a mechanism to de-legitimate the academy.
These examples of the popular press decontextualising serious academic research are often
in the sciences or social sciences. However, the humanities are also at risk in an open-access world.
40 Osborne, p. 105.
41 Luke Salkeld, ‘A Birdbrained Idea? Outrage as Academics Are Handed £2m to Study How Humans Interact with 
CHICKENS’, Mail Online, 2013 <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-2425213/Outrage-academics-
handed-2m-study-humans-interact-CHICKENS.html> [accessed 6 May 2016]; Greg Hurst, ‘Prove Research Is 
Useful or Lose Funds, Universities Are Told’, The Times (London) (London, 16 December 2015), section Education
<http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/education/article4642025.ece> [accessed 6 May 2016]; Javier Espinoza, 
‘Universities Wasting Public Money on “Pointless” Research, Says Think Tank’, The Telegraph (London, 22 July 
2015) <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/education/educationnews/11756727/Universities-wasting-public-money-on-
pointless-research-says-think-tank.html> [accessed 6 May 2016].
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Should the tabloids get their hands on various poststructuralist readings of literary texts – as one
example – they would easily be able to cause a storm of ridicule and shame for the institutions and
researchers that they targeted. Sometimes, though, this shaming comes from within the academy
itself.  The philosopher  Denis Dutton's  “Bad Writing Contest”  famously pointed to  the prose of
William V. Spanos and Judith Butler as models of obscurantism.42 It is possible, though, that such
intra-academic shaming (also seen in areas of quality control, such as that in the Sokal affair/hoax)
is more prevalent in a culture of closed publication, since there must be an element of revelation for
the humiliation to work. Dutton's contest held general public appeal because there was no way for
the general public, usually, to see academic writing and the levels of opacity that such prose can
reach, even if those writing, such as Butler, might claim that the opaque prose is more expressive
and truthful than a populist writing style. Shame of opacity through revelation and exposure does
seem to be a risk of open access.
In turn, this potential for public shame may prompt behavioural changes among researchers
and universities. Indeed, institutions now employ press managers and public-relations consultants to
attempt to manage the way in which work is displayed in popular venues. As such institutions
become ever-more dependent upon donations from wealthy alumni, it is certainly the case that such
management  is  financially  prudent.  However,  researchers  have  become accustomed to  working
within a symbolic economy that is somewhat altered by an open-access world. What I mean by this
is  that  the  system  of  patronage  that  constitutes  academic  remuneration  (where  researchers,
remember, are not tied directly to the need to sell their work to live) is one that is founded on a
system of prestige. Traditionally, this is accrued by researchers who can pass the toughest peer-
review procedures and produce the most, high-quality work, thereby affiliating themselves with the
“brand”  name  of  respected  presses  and  journals.  As  with  all  of  Pierre  Bourdieu's  symbolic
economies, however, those who can fare well in the medium of prestige can translate that back into
42 Denis Dutton, ‘Language Crimes: A Lesson in How Not to Write, Courtesy of the Professoriate’, The Wall Street 
Journal (New York, 5 February 1999).
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a salary in cold, hard cash through job appointments, promotions and more.
General public exposure of these venues (presses and journals) changes the norms by which
academics are usually evaluated. When the situation is one of talking to one's peers within known
contexts, the arguments can be nonetheless intensely fierce. When such work is re-contextualised to
a broader public for evaluation, the standards and background contexts that are brought to bear on
the work are different. This is why phenomena such as the impact agenda in the United Kingdom –
implemented for the Research Excellence Framework in 2014 – have come under fire from various
parties. “Impact” is here defined (loosely by the Higher Education Funding Council for England) as
a desirable causal effect outside academia that can be attributed to the reach and significance of
research outputs.43 While the panels that evaluated such “impact” were composed of academics, the
evidence  base  that  must  be  marshalled  in  order  to  score  highly  in  this  exercise  must  include
members of the broader public who will not necessarily share the academic contexts within which
the original research was conducted. In some disciplines, such as translational biomedicine, this is
not so problematic. Developing drugs that can change people's lives is fairly easy to demonstrate,
even if the original work was hard to do. On the other hand, the educational benefits of humanities
research are often harder to slot into such a rigid paradigm. In any case, the kickback against this
was again one of academic freedom. If it is necessary to satisfy a broader cross-section of the public
in  terms  of  impact  then  there  are  implicit  restrictions  placed  upon  the  research  topics  that
researchers may wish to prudently investigate.
The same can be said for open publication. It is not known what effects we might see from
widespread access to academic research and a new set of norms forming around its evaluation. That
said, there may be no harm whatsoever in insisting that the university speak beyond its own walls,
in an effort to integrate an otherwise sealed academy back into society. In terms of the observational
paradigms  under  which  this  might  fall,  I  would  suggest  that  the  academy currently  remains  a
43 Higher Education Funding Council for England, ‘Assessment Criteria and Level Definitions : REF 2014’, 2014 
<http://www.ref.ac.uk/panels/assessmentcriteriaandleveldefinitions/> [accessed 11 May 2016].
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disciplinary  structure  sitting  within  a  broader  society  of  control.  Open publication  practice  de-
normalizes the disciplinary procedures via which research work is usually read and understood,
extending evaluation throughout a societal totality. Of course, it is well known that if you want to
change behaviour, the easiest thing to do is to measure the aspect that you wish to alter. In a society
of control and open-publication, academic unease can often be expressed as a fear of shaming. For
in order to know how to behave, one must know how one is to be evaluated. In a society-wide
system of evaluation, it is far harder to predict how such norms will coalesce.
Publish Like Nobody's Reading?
In this chapter, I have examined two opposed sets of shameful practice in the academy, both centred
around access. For the first part, I have set out the reasons why the current limited circulation of
academic material can be considered shameful, rooted in a history of charitable education meeting a
set of new technologies that reconfigure the labour practices of publication. The fact that the means
exist to disseminate material globally at near-unlimited levels, but go unused, despite the patronage-
like structures within the academy that permit academic ownership, triggers a type of shame that is
akin to being seen to be hiding. The shame of being found to be trying to be invisible when one is
nonetheless  sought.  On  the  other  hand,  widespread  circulation  of  academic  material
recontextualises the norms of reception for a previously insular conversation. In the tabloid press,
for instance, this can lead to challenging personal and institutional situations that do not understand
the purpose of work.  On the other  hand,  the broad spectrum of individuals among the general
population  who  possess  academic  degrees  and  can  understand  research  work  is  frequently
underestimated. Indeed, the potential for shaming can be undone by researchers working for a better
understanding of their own fields among wider publics. For it strikes me that as the shame of hiding
is intensified and visibility is sought, the risks of public shaming will only increase. Academics
must,  therefore,  work  to  foster  norms  throughout  society  that  are  accepting  of  good  research
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